Disqualifications for Unemployment Compensation in the District of Columbia by Goss, Thomas Marks
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 4 Summer 1980 Article 17 
1980 
Disqualifications for Unemployment Compensation in the District 
of Columbia 
Thomas Marks Goss 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas M. Goss, Disqualifications for Unemployment Compensation in the District of Columbia , 29 Cath. 
U. L. Rev. 1055 (1980). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/17 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Unemployment compensation provides monetary benefits for individu-
als who are unemployed through no fault of their own.' Under state un-
employment compensation programs, authorized by the Social Security
Act of 1935,2 employers contribute to a central fund in amounts based on
the level of benefits paid to former employees in the past. In the District
of Columbia, the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act4
provides unemployment benefits to those separated from employment,5
1. See Gordon v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 402 A.2d 1251, 1255 n.6
(D.C. 1979); Williams v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 383 A.2d 345, 349
(D.C. 1978) (quoting Von Stauffenberg v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 269
A.2d 110, 111 (D.C. 1970), a'd, 459 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). See also Cohen v. Dis-
trict Unemployment Compensation Bd., 167 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Doherty v. District
Unemployment Compensation Bd., 283 A.2d 206,209 (D.C. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932
(1972). For a discussion of the purposes of unemployment compensation, see Bums, Unem-
ployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. I (1945); Packard, Un-
employment Without Fault- Disqualifications for Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 17 VILL.
L. REv. 635, 636 n.7 (1972). Other objectives of unemployment compensation include: en-
couraging full and stable employment by means of financial incentives to employers; pro-
moting good industrial labor relations; and rehabilitating and retraining the unemployed.
See id at 636 n.7. An unemployment compensation system is designed to favor compensa-
tion through employment rather than welfare compensation. See District Unemployment
Compensation Bd. v. William Hahn & Co., 399 F.2d 987, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976). The original act excluded many classes of workers
such as government employees, agricultural workers, and teachers. Now state laws cover
86% of all non-agricultural wage and salary employment. See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAIN-
ING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: STATE LAWS
AND EXPERIENCE 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as STATE LAWS]. For a discussion of the rela-
tionship between federal and state provisions, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT 35-41 (1976). See also notes 13-37 and accompanying text infra.
3. The amount of contributions are based on the employer's experience rating, so that
an employer who has lost many employees will pay at a higher rate than one who has lost
few. See D.C. CODE §§ 46-302 to 46-303 (1973).
4. Ch. 794, 49 Stat. 946 (1935) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 46-301 to 46-326 (1973)).
5. See D.C. CODE § 46-309 (1973). In order to become eligible for unemployment
benefits, a District employee must file a claim with the Bureau of Employment Security of
the District of Columbia Department of Labor. The claimant must have earned a set
amount of wages in his base period before he is eligible for benefits. Base period means the
first four out of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceeding the first
day of the individual's benefit year. The benefit year is a 52-week period beginning with the
first week that the individual files a valid claim for benefits. Thereafter, the 52-week period
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but subjects some workers to periods of ineligibility by its disqualification
provisions. 6 The major circumstances justifying disqualification are: vol-
untarily leaving one's job without good cause; discharge because of mis-
conduct by the employee; failure to apply for or accept suitable reemploy-
ment; and unemployment caused by a labor dispute.7
Significant changes were made in the local unemployment compensa-
tion plan with the enactment of the District of Columbia Unemployment
Compensation Act Amendments of 1978.8 Under the new act, the period
of disqualification for voluntary leaving without good cause and for mis-
conduct, which formerly varied from four-to-nine weeks, was increased to
six-to-twelve weeks.9 In addition, the Act provides for a ten per cent re-
duction in benefits to any individual found to have voluntarily left em-
ployment without good cause or to have engaged in misconduct leading to
dismissal.' 0 This reduction only applies when, during the preceding year,
benefits paid out of the fund exceeded contributions and interest paid into
the fund. "
The Department of Labor (DOL) has established guidelines for the
states to follow in enacting legislation.' 2 These guidelines have been fol-
lowed to some extent in the District of Columbia's unemployment com-
pensation plan. This Note will consider the 1978 changes with a view
toward how they reflect unemployment compensation policy and will offer
suggestions for further changes in the plan. Also included is a survey of
the application of the law of unemployment compensation in the District
of Columbia.
begins with the first day of the first week the claimant files a valid claim after the termina-
tion of his last preceeding benefit year. Id § 46-307(c). Certain persons are not eligible
because the type of employment in which they were engaged is not covered under the Act.
These include teachers, professional athletes, and aliens. Id § 46-309(g), (h), (i). The claim-
ant must be available and physically able to work. Id § 46-309(c), (d).
6. For the specific length of time for each type of disqualification, see notes 51, 75, 80
and 88 infra.
7. D.C. CODE § 46-310(a)-(c), (f) (1973). See also notes 48-98 and accompanying text
infra.
8. D.C. Law 2-129 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of D.C. CODE §§ 46-301 to 46-
326 (1973 & Supp. VII 1980).
9. D.C. CODE § 46-310(a), (b) (Supp. VII 1980).
10. Id § 46-310(0.
11. Id The District of Columbia City Council also has the option of disapproving the
lower payments.
12. See BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE POLICY (1962) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE POLICY].
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I. DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
PLANS
A. Federal Recommendations by the Department of Labor
The enactment of state unemployment compensation laws was given ini-
tial impetus by the Social Security Act of 1935.' 3 Under the Act, the fed-
eral government provides funding for the administration of the state
unemployment compensation plans. 4 Each state plan is reviewed by the
DOL to determine whether the state is complying with the Act's provi-
sions.' 5 Funding may be terminated if unemployment compensation is de-
nied in a substantial number of cases to individuals entitled to benefits
under state law. 6 Nevertheless, a state is not required to enact unemploy-
ment compensation laws in full conformity with the federal plan. 7 Thus,
the Social Security Act provides only general recommendations by which
states may administer benefits. Under section 503(a)(1), for example, the
method of administration must be reasonably calculated to insure full pay-
ment of unemployment compensation when due. 8 In addition, the federal
13. Ch. 531, §§ 301-304, 49 Stat. 626 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 501-504
(1976)). For a discussion of the events leading to the enactment of federal legislation, see
Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8
VAND. L. REV. 181 (1955).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 502 (1976).
15. Id § 503(a).
16. Id § 503(b)(1).
17. The Act also sets specific requirements for handling of funds and record-keeping.
Id § 503(a)(2), (4)-(9) (1976). Once the requirements are met, the federal government
makes payments to the states out of the Unemployment Trust Fund. Id §§ 1101-1104. The
Federal Unemployment Tax Act makes specific requirements for the taxation of employers.
Id §§ 3301-3311.
18. Id § 503(a)(1). This requirement was interpreted in California Dept. of Human
Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (197 1), in which the Supreme Court found that "when due"
means when benefits result from a hearing in which both parties had notice and were per-
mitted to present their respective positions. In that case, the claimant was determined to be
eligible for benefits in the initial interview. However, when the employer appealed, the
employee's benefits were suspended during the appeal. This suspension provision in the
California statute was found to be contrary to the "when due" requirement. The Court in
Java avoided the question of whether a claimant has a due process right to a hearing, but a
federal district court has found that a claimant is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing before
termination of benefits. See Wheeler v. Vermont, 335 F. Supp. 856 (D.C. Vt. 1972) citing
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The requirements of such a hearing are: timely and
adequate notice of the reasons for termination; effective opportunity to defend; the right to
retain counsel; and findings of fact based on the record. 397 U.S. at 266-7 I. See Hawkins v.
District Unemployment Bd., 381 A.2d 619 (D.C. 1977). If no such hearing is provided by the
federal employer, the state agency may make its own determination of the employee's enti-
tlement to benefits. See Smith v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 435 F.2d 433,
439 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 313, 90 Stat. 2667 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 8506(a)
(Supp. 1979)). Prior to 1976, the state was required to accept the findings of the federal
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statute requires an opportunity for a fair hearing for all individuals whose
claims are denied.' 9 These broad federal standards have allowed the states
to develop widely varying unemployment statutes.20 Although critics of
the Act have called for stricter federal standards, 21 Congress has been re-
luctant to diminish the states' role in developing their own unemployment
compensation programs.
Although the legislative scheme discourages federal involvement, the
DOL in 1962 issued an unemployment insurance legislative statement of
policy which was intended to aid the state legislatures in designing unem-
ployment compensation programs.22 With regard to disqualifications,
these DOL recommendations stress that an unemployment insurance sys-
tem should give insured workers confidence that they will receive benefits
during periods of involuntary unemployment; therefore, the system should
not contain unreasonable conditions and restrictions. 23 The Labor De-
partment suggests that, in all cases where a claimant is found eligible, there
be no more than a one week waiting period before benefits begin. Most
states have complied with this recommendation in order to allow time for
a determination of eligibility for benefits and to preserve the assets of the
state unemployment fund by exempting those unemployed for such a short
period.24 This one week waiting period has been found to be consistent
with the requirement of section 503(a)(1) of the Social Security Act that
unemployment compensation programs be calculated to insure full pay-
ment of benefits when due.25 In order to demonstrate whether the worker
employer if a fair hearing was provided, but now the state agency may make its own inquiry
into the matter. Id
19. Because termination from federal government jobs is a common occurrence in the
District of Columbia, there often is a problem with conflicting procedures between the Dis-
trict and the federal government. An employee terminated from a federal government job
has a right to a fair hearing. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1976). Also, unemployment benefits
are a form of statutory entitlement for those eligible; therefore, proper procedures must be
followed before the right may be taken away. See note 18 supra.
20. Seegenerally UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVICE, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING
ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT IN-
SURANCE LAWS, (October 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMPARISON].
21. See DeVyver, Federal Standards in Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 411
(1955). Among the reasons proposed for enacting stronger federal standards are that state
and local governments have failed to assume responsibility and to initiate action and that
interstate competition fostered by variance among state laws creates unfair situations. States
can accelerate this competition by changing laws to provide lower benefits, thereby lowering
taxes to employers. Id
22. LEGISLATIVE POLICY, supra note 12.
23. Id at 55.
24. Id at 56.
25. See Neville v. Illinois, 388 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. I11. 1974) (one week delay is reason-
able). For a discussion of the "when due" requirement, see note 18 supra.
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is currently attached to the labor force, the DOL recommendations recog-
nize that the states should enact requirements that the claimant be both
available and able to work.26
The DOL recommendations recognize three principal reasons for a state
to disqualify a claimant from unemployment benefits. First, an employee's
disqualification may be justified if he voluntarily leaves without good
cause. To promote mobility in the labor force and preserve the worker's
incentive to improve his economic status, the recommendations permit the
good cause requirement to be satisfied not only by work-related circum-
stances but by personal reasons as well.27 Second, discharge for miscon-
duct constitutes a reason for disqualification. The DOL recommends that
the misconduct be connected with the work, since the conduct of workers
unrelated to the job should not affect their employment.2" Some states
have enacted a more stringent disqualification provision where an em-
ployee is discharged for gross misconduct.29 The DOL recommendations
suggest that this be limited to situations where a claimant is discharged for
committing a criminal act and is tried and convicted by a court of law.3°
Third, an individual may be disqualfied for refusal to accept suitable
work.3'
The DOL recommendations also set standards with respect to the length
of disqualification. Under the federal recommendations, each state is to
establish a fixed period of disqualification in its unemployment compensa-
tion statute.32 Since the purpose of disqualification is not to penalize the
claimant but to limit the payment of benefits to the time he is unable to
find suitable work, the length of the period should be limited to time that
the claimant's own action continues to be the cause of his unemployment.
For this reason, federal policy suggests that the period be fixed by statute
to the average length of time an employable worker would spend finding
suitable work in a normal labor market.33 Accordingly, DOL determined
that an employable worker would take an average of six weeks to secure
reemployment.34 If the disqualified claimant takes a longer time in finding
26. See LEGISLATIVE POLICY, supra note 12, at 57.
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id.
29. See COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 4-8 & 4-31 to 4-33.
30. LEGISLATIVE POLICY supra note 12, at 63.
31. In defining suitable work, the DOL considers the suitability of the work for the
individual, not the individual for the job. LEGISLATIVE POLICY, supra note 12, at 64.
32. Id at 65.
33. Id.
34. Id For new data showing a longer period of 22 to 31 weeks, see EMPLOYMENT AND
TRAINING ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, A STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF THE
19801 1059
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a job, the reason for his unemployment is presumed not to be due to the
actions that caused his disqualification but to economic circumstances in
the labor market that are beyond his control. According to the DOL, the
length of disqualification should be constant regardless of the reason for
disqualification because it is difficult to determine whether a separation
from employment is by reason of a quit or a discharge, and the factual
situations in voluntary separations and refusal of suitable work are often
identical.35
A disqualification for an employee's participation in a labor dispute is
treated differently from the three previous disqualifications because the la-
bor dispute disqualification affects groups of workers rather than individu-
als and because the employment relationship is not severed. In a
disqualification because of a labor dispute, the DOL recommends that the
disqualification continue as long as the labor dispute causes a stoppage of
the employer's work and should end either when the stoppage ends or
when the stoppage ceases to be due to the labor dispute.36 The length of
the active labor dispute should not be determinative of the disqualification
period since it is inherently difficult to determine how long a labor dispute
remains in active progress. 37
It is not necessary for the states to follow these federal standards pre-
cisely. Nevertheless, state legislators should keep the reasons underlying
the DOL recommendations in mind when devising statutes. The need for
uniform state laws is underscored by the mobility of the work force across
state lines. Therefore, each state should take the initiative to conform its
unemployment compensation system to the federal scheme.
B. The District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act
I. Administrative Procedures for Determination of Claims
Section 11 of the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation
Act covers administrative procedures for the determination of unemploy-
ment compensation claims by District workers. 38  When a District em-
ployee is terminated because of conditions that would disqualify a worker
under section 10, his employer is required to file a separation report with
the Bureau of Employment Security within forty-eight hours after the ter-
IMPACT OF DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS
39 (Occasional Paper 79-1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL EVALUATION].
35. LEGISLATIVE POLICY, supra note 12, at 66.
36. Id at 70.
37. Id
38. D.C. CODE § 46-311 (1973).
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mination.39 After a claim is filed, a claims examiner promptly determines
if the claim is payable. For payable claims, he decides when payments will
begin, the maximum duration of benefits, and the weekly benefit
amount. 40 Notice of this initial determination must be provided to the
claimant, his most recent employer, and all his base period employers.4'
The claimant or any party may appeal the initial determination to an ap-
peal tribunal within ten days.
42
The initial determination of the claims examiner is subsequently trans-
mitted to an appeal tribunal43 that may modify the initial determination
after providing notice to the parties." The decision of this appeal tribunal
may be appealed to the Board within a ten-day period. It is critical that
the appeal be filed within the ten-day period because judicial review will
be precluded if administrative remedies are not exhausted.45 A decision of
the Board may be appealed within thirty days to the District of Columbia
Superior Court. 6
39. 18 D.C.R.R. § 204.3 (1970). If 25 or more workers are involved, a Mass Separation
Report must be filed. Id § 204.4. If a labor dispute is involved, a Notice of Unemployment
Due to Strike or Labor Dispute must be filed. 1d § 204.5. An employer who fails to supply
such reports will be presumed to have admitted that the worker is not subject to disqualifica-
tion. Id § 204.6.
40. D.C. CODE § 46-311(b) (1973).
41. 18 D.C.R.R. § 302.1 (1970). "Base period" is defined at note 5, supra.
42. D.C. CODE § 46-31 l(b) (1973). The purpose of such a short appeal period is not to
discourage appeals but to prevent unreasonable delays in the payment of benefits. See
Atchison & Keller, Inc. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 435 F.2d 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). The claimant or any party aggrieved may first petition the claims examiner for a
redetermination of the initial finding in lieu of the formal appeal procedure. The petition
for redetermination, however, does not stop the running of the 10-day period for appeal. 18
D.C.R.R. § 302.2 (1970). The redetermination may also be appealed. Id
43. The appeal tribunal consists of either one appeals examiner, employed by the Bu-
reau, or a body composed of an examiner acting as chairman, one employee representative,
and one employer representative. D.C. CODE § 46-311(d) (1973).
44. Id. § 46-311 (b). The appeal tribunal must provide a fair hearing for all parties. Id
§ 46-31 (e).
45. The decision of the appeal tribunal is final unless a petition for appeal to the Board
is filed within 10 days from the mailing of the decision, or unless the Board takes action of
its own within the 10-day period. Id § 46-31 l(e). A timely appeal must be filed in order to
obtain judicial review. See Malcolm Price, Inc. v. District Unemployment Compensation
Bd., 350 A.2d 730 (D.C. 1976) (judicial review precluded even though decision was final
because appeal not filed within a 10-day period). A petition for redetermination of the
appeal tribunal decision may also be filed, but, as with the initial determination, this petition
does not stop the running of the 10-day period. 18 D.C.R.R. § 303.7 (1970). This petition
must be based on newly discovered evidence and be verified under oath. Id § 303.7(b).
46. D.C. CODE § 46-312 (1973).
19801 1061
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2. Disqualification Provisions
The District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act follows
some, but not all of the DOL recommendations regarding disqualification
provisions.47 Under the Act, to be eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion, a claimant must be both available for and able to work.4 8 The law is
designed to provide compensation for individuals who are unemployed
through no fault of their own.4 9 In addition, there is a legislative prefer-
ence for compensation through employment rather than through welfare
assistance.5°
a. Voluntary Leaving Without Good Cause
Under section 10(a) of the Act, an individual may be disqualified for
leaving his most recent job voluntarily without good cause.5 After an ini-
tial waiting period of one week, one so disqualified is deprived of benefits
for a period not less than six nor more than twelve weeks. 2 Under the
voluntary leaving section, each case is subject to a two-part inquiry.53 The
47. Id § 46-310. For example, the D.C. Act does not include the DOL recommenda-
tions for a fixed period of disqualification of six weeks. The disqualification for voluntary
leaving and misconduct can be longer than that for failure to find suitable work, and the
reduction of benefits is contrary to DOL recommendations. See notes 101-122 and accom-
panying text infra.
48. D.C. CODE § 46-309 (1973).
49. See note I and accompanying text supra.
50. See District Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. William Hahn & Co., 399 F.2d
987, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
51. D.C. CODE § 46-310(a) (Supp. VII 1980) reads as follows:
An individual who left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause con-
nected with the work, as determined by the Board under regulations prescribed by
it, shall not be eligible for benefits with respect to the week for which he first files
for benefits and with respect to not less than six nor more than twelve consecutive
weeks of unemployment which immediately follow such week. The length of the
disqualification shall be determined by the Board under regulations prescribed by
it, according to the seriousness of the case. In the event such leaving occurs when
the individual has an unexpired benefit year, the disqualification shall commence
with the week for which he reopens his claim. In addition, such individual's total
benefit amount shall be reduced in a sum equal to the number of weeks of disquali-
fication multiplied by his weekly benefit amount.
52. Id The prior statute withheld benefits for a period of four to nine weeks. Some
jurisdictions provide for variable periods, ranging up to 25 weeks in Texas and Colorado;
others have a fixed period, the longest being 13 weeks; the rest disqualify the employee for
the duration of his unemployment. See COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 4-7.
53. A regulation based upon the statute states:
In determining whether the leaving is such as to disqualify the individual for bene-
fits for the time prescribed, it must appear that the leaving on his part was (1)
voluntary in fact, within the ordinary meaning of that term, and (2) without good
cause, in light of all such facts, conditions, and circumstances as are relevant to the
1062 [Vol. 29:1055
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Bureau must determine, first, whether the termination was voluntary. For
this threshold question, there is a presumption that the termination was
involuntary.54 Second, if the Bureau determines that the employee left
voluntarily, it must then decide whether the employee had good cause for
leaving. The burden of proof is on the claimant to establish good cause.55
Under the Regulations, good cause depends upon the facts of each case,
but will not depend solely on conditions connected with the employment.
56
As examples of what would not be good cause for voluntarily leaving em-
ployment, the regulations consider: refusal to obey reasonable rules and
regulations; minor reduction in wages; transfer from one type of work to
another which is reasonable and necessary; marriage or divorce resulting
in a change of residence; general dissatisfaction with work; and vague
prospects of other work deemed more desirable by the claimant.57
A problem that frequently arises with respect to voluntary leaving is the
"quit or be fired" situation, in which the employee learns from the em-
ployer that he will be terminated but resigns before the termination. This
procedure can be advantageous for both the employee and employer. By
agreeing to resign, the employee can have a poor work record erased,
thereby increasing his chances for future employment. The employer can
save time and money by avoiding a hearing to which an employee may be
entitled.58 In Thomas v. District of Columbia Department of Labor59 and in
Carpenter v. District Unemployment Compensation Board,6" the District of
particular case. Ordinarily a leaving will be presumed to be involuntary on the part
of the claimant unless the facts clearly indicate otherwise. Where it appears that
the leaving was voluntary, the burden of proof shall be on the claimant to establish
good cause. What is good cause for leaving will accordingly depend upon the facts
in each case and will not be confined to causes connected solely with the employ-
ment itself. The test will be - what would the reasonable and prudent individual
in the labor market do in like circumstances.
18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a) (1970) (emphasis in original).
54. Id
55. Id. For examples of good cause see Celanese Corp. V. Bartlett, 200 Md. 397, 90
A.2d 208 (1952) (sickness); Mee's Bakery v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
162 Pa. Super. Ct. 185, 56 A.2d 386 (1948) (family obligations); Department of Labor &
Indus. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 518, 3 A.2d 211
(1938) (inconsequence of notification of lay-off); Ayers v. Employment Security Dep't, 85
Wash. 2d 550, 536 P.2d 610 (1975) (spouse's relocation due to employment). See Note, 51
WASH. L. REV. 391.
56. 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a) (1970). This requirement may have been changed by the
enactment of D.C. Law 2-129 (1979). See notes 114-115 and accompanying text infra.
57. 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(b) (1970).
58. See Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor, 409 A.2d 164, 170 (D.C. 1979).
Courts do not discourage this practice.
59. 409 A.2d 164 (D.C. 1979)
60. 409 A.2d 175 (D.C. 1979).
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Columbia Court of Appeals recently considered the application of section
10(a) to this employment situation.
In Thomas, an employee learned from her supervisor that disciplinary
action was going to be taken against her because of her poor work per-
formance. The supervisor advised her that she could resign, adding that
she could confer with her union representative. If she resigned, her em-
ployer would destroy her poor record.6 After contacting her union repre-
sentative, the employee decided to resign. At her benefits interview with
the claims examiner, the claimant stated that she was leaving for personal
reasons, but the purpose stated on her separation form and on the form
supplied to the Board by her employer was "to seek employment else-
where."62 The claims examiner found that the claimant voluntarily left
work for personal reasons without good cause.6 3 At her hearing before the
appeals examiner, the claimant testified that she had had problems at
home, but that she had in fact resigned under the threat of being fired.
The appeals examiner therefore affirmed that she had left voluntarily with-
out good cause.64
On appeal, the claimant argued that her separation was involuntary as a
constructive discharge because of the employer's threat of discharge. 65
Under such circumstances, if the employee believes that firing is imminent,
his leaving should be considered involuntary or, at least, voluntary with
good cause. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the evi-
dence on the record was insufficient to rebut the presumption under sec-
tion 10(a) that the leaving was involuntary.66 Therefore, the employee
could not be disqualified under section 10(a) because the employer did not
meet his burden of proof.67
In Carpenter,68 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals again found
the record describing an employee's termination to be insufficient to over-
come the presumption of involuntary leaving. The evidence showed that
the employee, when confronted with an ultimatum that refusal to resign
would result in her discharge, had decided to resign. Therefore, as in
61. Such an outcome was especially important to her because she looked forward to a
future in government employment. Id at 168.
62. Id.
63. Id at 167.
64. Id at 168.
65. Id at 169.
66. Id at 173-74.
67. Id. Prior to Thomas, the Board had inconsistently applied a per se rule of invol-
untariness if the employee had foregone the right to a hearing. In Thomas, the court of
appeals held this practice could not be continued. See id at 172-73.
68. 409 A.2d 175 (D.C. 1979).
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Thomas, the court found that the employee could not be disqualified for
voluntary leaving.6 9 This practice is common among employers, who pre-
fer to avoid the burden of showing misconduct under section 10(b) as the
reason for the employee's discharge.7" Under section 10(a), if the em-
ployee resigns, he bears the burden of showing good cause after the initial
presumption of involuntary resignation is overcome.7'
When a claimant's reason for leaving employment is the relocation of
the employer's place of business, the voluntariness of leaving is also at
issue. In National Geographic Society v. District Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board,72 the employer moved its offices from Washington, D.C. to
Rockville, Maryland, a distance of nineteen miles. The employer offered
the employees chartered bus transportation to the new location. Five em-
ployees refused to transfer because of the increased distance and time.
The Board allowed benefits to each claimant with a finding that the leav-
ings were involuntary but made no findings on the adequacy of the trans-
portation.73 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded, finding that the Board must also consider the ade-
quacy of transportation, including the chartered bus service, when deter-
mining the good cause issue.74
b. Discharge for Misconduct
Even if an employee is involuntarily terminated from employment, he
may still be disqualified from receiving benefits under section 10(b) of the
Act if he had engaged in misconduct which brought about his termina-
tion.75 In contrast to section 10(a), the burden of proof under section 10(b)
69. Id at 178.
70. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text infra.
71. See note 45 supra. See also 18 D.C.R.R. §§ 301.1(a) & 301.2(a) (1970).
72. 438 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
73. This involved a good cause question concerning both voluntary leaving and refusal
of suitable work. D.C. CODE § 46-310(a), (c) (1973). For a discussion of subsection (c), see
notes 80-87 and accompanying text infra.
74. 438 F.2d at 158. Other jurisdictions would consider a distance of 15 to 20 miles
reasonable. See, e.g., Szojka v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 187 Pa.
Super. Ct. 643, 146 A.2d 81 (1958) (32 miles); Tunget v. State Employment Sec. Dep't, 2
Wash. App. 574, 468 P.2d 734 (1970) (17 miles).
75. D.C. CODE § 46-310(b) (Supp. VII 1980) reads as follows:
An individual who has been discharged for misconduct occuring in the course of
his most recent work proved to the satisfaction of the Board shall not be eligible for
benefits with respect to the week for which he first files for benefits and with respect
to not less than six nor more than twelve consecutive weeks of unemployment
which immediately follow such week. The length of the disqualification shall be
determined by the Board under regulations prescribed by it, according to the seri-
ousness of the case. In the event such a discharge occurs when the individual has
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is on the party alleging the misconduct, usually the employer, but there is
no presumption of involuntariness in the employee's favor in the absence
of evidence of such misconduct. The section 10(b) disqualification period
is the same as for section 10(a) - six-to-twelve weeks. 6 Misconduct is
illustrated in the regulations as: willing violation of employer's rules; in-
toxication; repeated disregard of reasonable orders; sabotage; gross neglect
of duties and studied inefficiency; insubordination; and dishonesty.77 In
most cases, however, the facts at issue are unique, and all evidence offered
at the benefits hearing must be considered.78
The general rule in a disqualification for misconduct case is .that the
employee's act must be in willful disregard of the employer's interest or a
deliberate violation of the employer's rules. Misconduct may also consist
of disregard of reasonable standards of behavior or extreme negligence.79
c. Failure to Apply for or Accept Suitable Employment
Under section 10(c) of the Act, a claimant may also be disqualified for
failure to apply for or accept suitable employment upon termination of his
earlier employment status. 80 A disqualification period under section 10(c)
an unexpired benefit year, the disqualification shall commence with the week for
which he reopens his claim. In addition, such individual's total benefit amount
shall be reduced in a sum equal to the number of weeks of disqualification multi-
plied by his weekly benefit amount.
76. Id About half the states have similar varying penalties, ranging from two to six
weeks in Alabama, to five to twenty-six weeks in South Carolina. Many states have a flat
disqualification period and some disqualify for the duration of unemployement or longer.
See COMPARISON, supra note 14, at 4-8. Some states provide for a longer disqualification
period for gross misconduct, which can include a felony, assault, theft, sabotage, or embez-
zlement. Id
77. 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.2(b) (1970).
78. For examples of good cause that have been upheld by the courts in the District of
Columbia, see Dyer v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Bd., 392 A.2d 1
(D.C. 1978) (employee violated company rule not to make written complaints of dissatisfac-
tion with company; insubordination); Marshall v. District Unemployment Compensation
Bd., 377 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1973) (police officer refused to shave beard for religious reasons);
Colvin v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 306 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1973) (employee
shortened workday and fired two employees without authorization); Kartsonis v. District
Unemployment Compensation Bd., 289 A.2d 370 (D.C.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 872 (1972)
(poor work performance); Goggins v. Hoddes, 265 A.2d 302 (D.C. 1970) (dishonesty).
79. See Hickenbottom v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 273 A.2d 475,
477-78 (D.C. 1971).
80. D.C. CODE § 46-310(c) (1973) reads:
If any individual otherwise eligible for benefits fails, without good cause as deter-
mined by the Board under regulations prescribed by it, either to apply for new
work found by the Board to be suitable when notified by an employment office or
to accept any suitable work when offered to him by any employment office, his
union hiring hall, or any employer direct, he shall not be eligible for benefits with
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may range from four to nine weeks. The statute sets out criteria for the
Bureau to determine whether the work is suitable: the physical fitness and
prior training, experience, and earnings of the individual; the distance of
the place of work from the individual's residence; and the risk involved as
to health, safety, and morals.8 Using these general standards, the Bureau
considers not only whether the work is suitable but also whether the claim-
ant had good cause for failing to accept suitable work.8" In this inquiry,
the Bureau has substantial discretion in determining what is suitable em-
ployment for the individual.83 Specifically rejected as good cause under
the regulations are: slight difference in wages or hours of work; difference
in locality where transportation facilities are adequate and economical;
temporary physical disability which does not substantially interfere with
ability to work; and general or personal objections to employer or to fellow
employees.84
A failure to accept suitable work is often found in conjunction with a
voluntary leaving. In National Geographic Society,85 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that the Board must provide findings on the adequacy
respect to the week in which such failure occured and with respect to not less than
four nor more than nine consecutive weeks of unemployment which immediately
follow such week, as determined by the Board in such case according to the seri-
ousness of the refusal. In addition such individual's total benefit amount shall be
reduced in a sum equal to the number of weeks of disqualification multiplied by
the weekly benefit amount. In determining whether or not work is suitable within
the meaning of this subsection the Board shall consider (1) the physical fitness and
prior training, experience and earnings of the individual, (2) the distance of the
place of work from the individual's place of residence, and (3) the risk involved as
to health, safety, or morals.
81. See note 80 supra for the full text of D.C. CODE § 46-310(c) (1973).
82. 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.3(a) (1970). Other jurisdictions have held that a skilled worker
generally does not have to accept a job at a lower position. See Pacific Mills v. Director of
Division of Employment Sec., 322 Mass. 345, 77 N.E.2d 413 (1948) (employee, trained for
office work at a business college, refused job as a shipping clerk; not required to work even
though pay was the same). But see In re Heater, 270 App. Div. 311, 313, 59 N.Y.S.2d 793,
795 (1946) (statute precluded finding that refusal of position on grounds that it involved
lower degree of skill was good cause). Often the extent of this prior training corresponds to
the worker's level of prior earnings because workers with lesser skills are usually paid lower
wages. Therefore an employee may generally refuse to work for a salary substantially less
than what he had previously received. Nevertheless, after a considerable length of time has
passed and the claimant is still unemployed, work at lower pay may become suitable. See In
re Johnson, 409 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1979); Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 48, 45 A.2d 886, 888
(1946).
83. See 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.3(a) (1970). These Regulations state that the Board may
adopt such further or additional standards as it believes will insure a reasonable determina-
tion. Id
84. 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.3(b) (1970).
85. 438 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir.'1970).
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of transportation before it can decide that the employee justifiably refused
to work at the employer's new location.16 In this determination, the dis-
tance of the place of work from the employee's place of residence is a
relevant consideration. 7
d Labor Disputes
An additional disqualification provision, section 10(f), prevents one who
is unemployed as a direct result of a labor dispute still in active progress
from receiving benefits."8 This disqualification does not apply, however, if
the employee is not participating or directly interested in the dispute and if
he does not belong to a grade or class of workers who are participants in
the dispute.89
The statutory provision for a labor dispute in active progress has been
broadly defined by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In National
Broadcasting Corp. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board,90 the
employer, NBC, refused to accept striking employees' offers to return to
work. The union and the employees argued that NBC was engaging in a
lockout and that the employees should be entitled to benefits because the
dispute was no longer in active progress.9 ' NBC argued that any lockout is
a labor dispute. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to
accept either position. The court classified the situation as a continuing
labor dispute and stated that claimants involved in it could not convert
that dispute into a situation of involuntary unemployment merely by offer-
ing to return to work.92 In Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment
Compensation Board,93 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ex-
tended the labor dispute disqualification to include alleged violations of a
collective bargaining agreement. The union had adopted the practice of
dispatching only a small number of senior workers for work. When this
forced the Post to pay these workers overtime, the Post asserted that the
union was abusing the terms of its collective bargaining agreement. The
employees, who were consequently laid off, contended that they were dis-
charged for economic reasons. Although the Board accepted the employ-
ees' argument, the court ruled that the employees' refusal to work was
86. Id at 158.
87. See note 80 supra.
88. D.C. CODE § 46-310(0 (1973 & Supp. VII 1980).
89. Id
90. 380 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977).
91. At this time, the District of Columbia lockout exception, added by D.C. Law 2-129
§ (aa) (1979) (codified at D.C. CODE § 46-310(0 (Supp. VII 1980)) was not in effect.
92. 380 A.2d at 1000.
93. 377 A.2d 436 (D.C. 1977).
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based on a labor dispute over the terms of an employment contract. The
court defined a labor dispute as any controversy concerning wages, hours,
working conditions, or terms of the employment arising out of the interests
of an employer and employee.94 The pressmen, therefore, were disquali-
fied from receiving unemployment compensation under section 10(f) of the
Act. 95
e. Other Disqualifications
In addition to the four preceding principal disqualifications, a claimant
who fails to attend a recommended training or retraining course without
good cause is disqualified for benefits under section 10(e).9 6 This disquali-
fication applies only to the week in which the failure occurred. Addition-
ally, an individual is disqualified under section 10(g) for any week during
which he receives unemployment compensation from any other state or
from the United States.97 Finally, any person who knowingly makes a
false statement or representation in order to obtain or increase any benefit
may be disqualified under section 10(e) for all or part of his benefit year
and for one year subsequent to his benefit year.98
The unemployment compensation system in the District of Columbia
has, therefore, never been in full conformity with the DOL recommenda-
tions. Nevertheless, the disqualification provisions in the District are less
severe than in other states.99 An effort to establish stricter disqualification
provisions was made in 1978 with the introduction and subsequent passage
of a bill to amend the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation
Act.'O
II. STRICTER DISQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1978
The District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act Amend-
94. Id at 437 n.1. Cf. National Labor Relations Act, § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 152(g) (1976)
(similar definition of a labor dispute).
95. Id at 440.
96. D.C. CODE § 46-310(e) (1973).
97. Id § 46-310(g).
98. Id § 46-319(e). The same penalty is imposed for a material omission of fact.
99. Thirty-two states disqualify a claimant for the duration of his unemployment if he
voluntarily left employment without good cause. For misconduct or refusal of suitable
work, 20 states disqualify a claimant for the duration of his unemployment. See COMPARI-
SON, supra note 20, at 4-27 to 4-39.
100. D.C. Bill 2-209 (1978).
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ments of 1978 I0 l modified both the nature of the disqualification require-
ments and their duration under the District unemployment compensation
plan. The effects of the Amendments are 1) to increase the period of dis-
qualification for voluntary leaving without good cause and discharge for
misconduct from the former four-to-nine week period to six-to-twelve
weeks; 10 2 2) to limit the good cause requirement for voluntary leaving to
good cause "connected with work;"13 3) to exempt lockouts from the la-
bor dispute disqualification;"° and 4) to reduce benefits by ten percent to
those who have been disqualified for voluntary leaving without good cause
and to those disqualified for misconduct. The last provision, section 10(i)
of the Act, operates only after two conditions are satisfied. 1°5 First, in the
101. D.C. Law 2-129 (1979) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 46-301 to 46-319 (Supp. VII
1980)).
102. D.C. CODE § 46-310 (Supp. VII 1980). These provisions were not in the original bill
when reported out of committee. See D.C. Bill 2-209 (1978). As originally adopted by the
Employment and Economic Development Committee, the bill provided for an indefinite
disqualification period for voluntary leaving and for gross misconduct. The Committee's
motive for making these changes was to achieve solvency of the District of Columbia Unem-
ployment Trust Fund by reducing the number of eligible persons, thus lowering the amount
paid out. At that time, the fund was indebted to the federal government in the amount of
$64 million. Estimates showed that the change for voluntary leaving would save $8 million,
and the addition of the gross misconduct provision would save $1 million per year. See
COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LEGISLATIVE REPORT FOR
BILL 2-209, 32-33 (1978).
At the first reading of the bill, the only change from the prior statute provided that good
cause for voluntary leaving must be "connected with the work." After adopting this change,
the City Council could not agree on the gross misconduct provision and decided to give the
bill further study. Representatives of management and labor were consulted to work out a
compromise. The Central Labor Council represented labor interests; the Washington Board
of Trade represented management. The resulting compromise eliminated the gross miscon-
duct provision and instituted a six to twelve week disqualification period for voluntary leav-
ing without good cause and discharge for misconduct. See D.C. COUNCIL MEETING
TRANSCRIPT, SECOND AMENDED FIRST READING ON BILL 2-209, 27-28 (June 27, 1978).
103. D.C. CODE § 46-310(a) (Supp. VII 1980). See note 51 supra for text of statute.
104. D.C. CODE § 46-310(0 (Supp. VII 1980).
105. The new subsection (i) reads in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7 of this Act, all benefits payable to an
individual subsequent to any disqualification period under the provisions of sec-
tions 10(a) or 10(b) of this Act, with respect to an initial claim which becomes
effective during a calendar year beginning after December 31, 1979, shall be re-
duced by an amount equal to ten per centum (10%) of the amount to which the
individual would otherwise be entitled, rounded to the next lower multiple of one
dollar: Provided, (1) that the total amount of benefits paid during the twelve month
period ending June 30 of the preceeding year exceeds the total amount of contribu-
tions and interest paid into the fund during the same period, as determined by the
Board by September 30 of 1979 and of each succeeding year; and (2) that the
Board so certified to the Council of the District of Columbia and that during the
forty-five day period. . . the Council does not adopt a resolution disapproving the
lower payments authorized by this subsection. . ..
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prior year ending June 30, benefits paid out of the fund must have ex-
ceeded contributions and interest paid into the fund. Second, the City
Council must not have disapproved the lower payments within forty-five
days after receiving the certification of the Bureau. 106
By extending the disqualification period for voluntary leaving and mis-
conduct from four-to-nine weeks to six-to-twelve weeks, 10 7 the Act brings
the District program in line with the average time it takes to find a job in a
normal market.'0 8 Recent statistics demonstrate that the time an employ-
able worker spends searching for a job ranges from twenty-two to thirty-
one weeks.' 019 The former four-to-nine week period, therefore, may not
discourage a worker from withdrawing from the labor force and remaining
unemployed if his discharge has been self-provoked. The six-week period
recommended by DOL also falls short of providing a genuine incentive to
work under normal market conditions. Thus, by increasing the disqualifi-
cation period, the District's amended statute is more likely to achieve the
federal objective of relating the disqualification period to the length of
time a worker spends securing reemployment.l"°
In contrast to this change in section 10(a), the four-to-nine week disqual-
ification period imposed by section 10(c) on a claimant who fails to apply
for or accept suitable work remains unchanged."' Since factual situations
are often similar under sections 10(a) and 10(c), 12 and claimants subject to
either section face similar work incentives, there is no obvious reason for
extending the period under only one of these sections. Extending the sec-
tion 10(c) disqualification period to six-to-twelve weeks to conform with
the change in section 10(a) would have been consistent with the DOL rec-
ommendation that such disqualification periods be identical." 13
The added requirement under section 10(a) that good cause for volun-
tary leaving be "connected with the work" may create problems in inter-
pretation. For example, there is no legislative history to the Amendments
D.C. CODE § 46-310(i) (Supp. VII 1980).
106. This provision, coupled with the change in §§ 10(a), (b) is estimated to save the fund
$6 million. See D.C. CITY COUNCIL MEETING TRANSCRIPT, SECOND AMENDED FIRST
READING ON BILL 2-209, 31-32 (June 27, 1978).
107. D.C. CODE §§ 46-310(a), (b) (Supp. VII 1980).
108. According to DOL, the period of the disqualification should be rationally related to
the length of time a job search should take. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
109. See STATISTICAL EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 39.
110. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
Ill. D.C. CODE § 46-310(c) (1973 & Supp. VII 1980). The legislative history of the
amendments gives no evidence why the § 10(c) period was not increased.
112. E.g., National Geographic Soc'y v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 438
F,2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See notes 72-74, 85-87 and accompanying text supra.
113. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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explaining how a good cause requirement might be fulfilled. Moreover,
the provision is in conflict with the District of Columbia Regulations stat-
ing that the cause of unemployment need not be related solely to the job,
but may also be based on "good personal cause.""' 4 Because of this con-
flict, if the employee becomes unable to carry out his duties at work be-
cause of family obligations or temporary sickness, it is unclear whether
those reasons would now be classified as "connected with work." It re-
mains to be seen how the clause added to section 10(a) will be interpreted.
Since the Bureau now has regulatory authority," 5 it should amend the
regulations to conform with the statutory requirement.
The amendments also substantively changed the definition of a labor
dispute with regard to a disqualification brought under section 10(f).'16 In
National Broadcasting Corp.,1 17 the court rejected the employer's argu-
ment that a lockout be considered a labor dispute. By providing an ex-
press exception for a lockout, the amendments align section 10(0) with
recent judicial construction of this section. However, it remains unclear
when a dispute is "still in active progress" for purposes of determining the
duration of a disqualification. This depends on whether the disqualifica-
tion ends when the work stoppage actually ceases or simply when the stop-
page ceases to be due to a labor dispute." 8 Section 10(f) should be
clarified to show that either situation will cause the disqualification period
to end.
The reduction in benefits for those disqualified for voluntary leaving or
misconduct is also still at odds with the DOL recommendations suggesting
that the unemployed worker should have maximum benefits to enable him
to search more adequately for new employment. This reduction was of-
fered to decrease the amount paid out of the unemployment compensation
fund to achieve solvency and thus reduce the District's indebtedness to the
federal government. The Act also incorporates a solvency tax on employ-
ers' accounts." 9 Therefore, even though the provision decreases the bene-
fits of some claimants, it consequently places a heavy tax burden on
employers. Since the maximum weekly benefit amount under the Dis-
trict's plan is the highest in the nation,' 2° a ten percent reduction in bene-
114. 18 D.C.R.R. § 301.1(a) (1970). For the text of this regulation see note 53 supra.
115. This authority is granted to the Bureau through D.C. CODE § 46-313(a) (Supp. VII
1980).
116. D.C. CODE § 46-310(f) (Supp. VII 1980).
117. 380 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977). For a discussion of this case, see notes 90-92 and accom-
panying text supra.
118. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
119. D.C. CODE § 46-303 (Supp. VII 1980).
120. See EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY TABLES,
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fits would therefore still allow the unemployed worker relatively high
benefits. Finally, recent data has shown that individuals who are disquali-
fied for the duration of their unemployment are more likely to find work
sooner than those who are not disqualified. 2' A claimant's knowledge
that his benefits will be reduced may prompt him to search more diligently
for new employment. Thus, fewer individuals may receive unemployment
benefits which could replenish the unemployment fund. The reduction is
therefore consistent with the objective of any unemployment compensa-
tion plan - encouraging compensation through employment rather than
through welfare.'22
IV. CONCLUSION
Claimants applying for unemployment compensation may be disquali-
fied for several reasons under the District of Columbia Unemployment
Compensation Act. Although the Act is not in full compliance with fed-
eral recommendations, it is consistent with the general purpose of unem-
ployment compensation - to provide benefits to individuals who are
unemployed through no fault of their own.' 23 With the enactment of the
District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act Amendments of
1978, the City Council has recognized the need for stricter controls on the
payment of benefits by increasing the length of the disqualification period
and by reducing benefits for voluntary leaving without good cause and
discharge for misconduct. Although these changes are partially inconsis-
tent with the federal scheme, they are a positive step in reducing the Dis-
trict's indebtedness to the federal government.
Thomas Marks Goss
32-33 (1978), which shows that the average weekly wage in the District of Columbia is
$139.00.
121. See STATISTICAL EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 101-03.
122. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
123. See note I supra.
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